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Version: 1.8

Production hardening

Before opening an instance to the internet, check what its public port serves, use trusted TLS certificates, and restrict cluster access. This page describes the service listeners of the current release. Before v1.6.0, metrics and health probes were served on the public API port and reachable through /api/<area>/...; upgrade before relying on the boundary described below.

Public port and operations port​

Each area's pods and Service have two HTTP ports:

PortNameWhat it servesRouted from outside
8080graphql/graphql, the area's own HTTP routes, and /graphiql when developer tools are enabledYes: the chart forwards /api/<area>/<path> to /<path>
8083ops/metrics, /healthz and /readyzNo: no chart route targets it

The operational endpoints answer without authentication, which is why they live on a port no public route reaches. Through the public prefix route, /api/<area>/metrics, /api/<area>/healthz and /api/<area>/readyz return 404: the API port does not serve those paths at all. Kubernetes probes and the chart's Prometheus ServiceMonitors use the ops port directly inside the cluster. See Observability.

/graphiql serves the explorer page without authentication when developer tools are enabled. Developer tools are disabled by default, and schema introspection is disabled with them.

/graphql is also reachable before sign-in: authentication and authorization depend on the operation. Login, SSO initiation and public discovery must work before a user has a token; protected operations still require verified credentials and permissions.

The service-token mint /auth/service-token and signing-key set /auth/jwks are on user-management's separate internal listener, not port 8080. The chart publishes no route to that listener; the public port returns 404 for those paths. Keep its Service internal. Go profiles are off by default and use a separate loopback listener when enabled; see Profiling a service.

Your own ingress or edge​

When you supply your own ingress controller, Gateway or reverse proxy, route the API only to the graphql port, never to ops, and never to user-management's internal listener. Close direct public access to node ports, load balancers and service ports other than your edge, so callers cannot reach the ops port by going around it.

If you enable developer tools on an instance reachable from the internet, block the explorer at the edge as well. For an NGINX reverse proxy in front of the chart's ingress or Gateway, add this location to the instance's HTTPS server block, before the general proxy location. devicechain_edge stands for your existing upstream to the ingress or Gateway:

location ~* ^/api/[^/]+/graphiql(/|$) {
return 403;
}
location / {
proxy_pass http://devicechain_edge;
}

Blocking the explorer does not block GraphQL queries, and with developer tools enabled schema introspection stays available on /graphql. Keep developer tools disabled on an internet-facing instance.

After an install, an upgrade or an edge change, check from outside without credentials:

curl -i https://INSTANCE_HOST/api/device-management/metrics
curl -i https://INSTANCE_HOST/api/device-management/healthz
curl -i https://INSTANCE_HOST/api/device-management/readyz
curl -i https://INSTANCE_HOST/api/device-management/graphiql

/metrics, /healthz and /readyz must return 404, or 403 if your own edge also blocks them. /graphiql must return 404 with developer tools disabled, or 403 with the rule above. Repeat for every enabled public area. Confirm sign-in and an authorized GraphQL request still work, probes stay healthy, and Prometheus still scrapes the services. Treat any metrics or health response from outside as an edge that routes to the ops port.

Cluster and credential controls​

  • Use trusted TLS certificates at the public edge and preserve broker TLS. See Connecting from outside.
  • Configure trusted proxies for the actual proxy chain so client-address limits use the intended source address.
  • Restrict network access to databases, the broker, monitoring and internal service ports, including ops; a public edge does not isolate pods from other cluster workloads.
  • Limit Kubernetes permissions to read Secrets, exec into pods or port-forward. Keep profiling disabled outside a controlled diagnostic session.
  • Protect the instance root key and backup material, and rehearse disaster recovery. Use least-privilege tenant roles and rotate leaked credentials. Review the remaining boundaries in the Security model.